And yet this explanation seemingly fails to account for children’s widespread tendency to attribute human-like mental states to inanimate entities, what is often referred to as anthropomorphism ( Waytz et al., 2010a Severson and Lemm, 2016). This corpus of work has shown that, contrary to Piaget’s assertion, young children (by age 3) are quite capable of distinguishing between animates and inanimates in terms of movement ( Gelman and Gottfried, 1996), biology ( Gelman, 2003), and psychological properties ( Gelman and Spelke, 1981). Piaget’s (1929) seminal work on animism – children’s tendency to attribute consciousness and life to inanimate objects – provided detailed observations and a theoretical framework to explain this tendency and, in turn, inspired decades of developmental research to uncover the nature of children’s conceptions (e.g., Gelman and Spelke, 1981 Carey, 1985 Gelman, 2003 Inagaki and Hatano, 2006). Young children often endow inanimate objects with a range of internal states (e.g., emotions, thought, and desires) and these attributions, as the above quote illustrates, can guide children’s behavior. “…if she brought home a flower, or a pebble she always brought several flowers or pebbles at the same time so they should have company and not feel lonely” ( Piaget, 1929, p. Results are discussed in terms of the differing degrees of imagination involved in anthropomorphism of animals versus technology and inanimate nature. Finally, children who frequently engaged with an invisible ICs more readily anthropomorphized in general and technology and inanimate nature in particular relative to all other children. Second, anthropomorphism of animals was highest amongst children with invisible ICs, followed by those with toy ICs and those who impersonated. Results indicated that the imaginative act of impersonating an animal, person, and/or machine was positively related to anthropomorphism, and specifically anthropomorphism of inanimate nature and technology. Ninety children (5, 7, and 9 years) were administered Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire – Child Form (IDAQ-CF), comprised of the technology-inanimate nature and animal subscales, and the Role Play Scale, which assessed (a) impersonation of animals, people, and/or machines and (b) imaginary companions (ICs), including invisible friends and personified toys.
The current study investigated the relation between children’s role play and anthropomorphism. We propose that the imaginative process of simulating and projecting internal states is common to both role play and anthropomorphism.
Similarly, anthropomorphism – the attribution of internal states to non-human others (e.g., animals, inanimate nature, or technologies) – also involves imagining others’ minds and internal states. Children’s role playing, whether personifying toys or imagining invisible friends, involves imagining others’ minds and internal states.
0 kommentar(er)
